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Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and
Petroleum Development Laws*
Northcutt Ely**
and
Robert F. Pietrowski, Jr. ***
The modern systems of laws governing mineral and petroleum development are simply the current phase in the centuriesold evolution of relationships between the consumer, the ruler,
the landowner, and the miner. In 1912, Herbert Hoover and his *
wife, Lou Henry Hoover, described these relationships in a footnote attached to their translation of Agricola's classic mining law
treatise, De Re Meta1lica;l their comment is particularly apropos
today to the problems faced today by the international mining
and petroleum industries:
There is no branch of the law of property of which the
development is more interesting and illuminating from a social
point of view than that relating to minerals. Unlike the land, the
minerals have ever been regarded as a sort of fortuitous property, for the title of which there have been four principal claimants-that is, the Overlord, as represented by the King, Prince,
Bishop, or what not; the Community or the State, as distinguished from the Ruler; the Landowner; and the Mine Operator,
to which class belongs the Discoverer. The one of these that
possessed the dominant right reflects vividly the social state and
sentiment of the period. The Divine Right of Kings; the measure
of freedom of their subjects; the tyranny of the land-owning
class; the rights of the Community as opposed to its individual
members; the rise of individualism; and finally, the modern
return to more communal view, have all been reflected promptly
in the mineral title. Of these parties the claims of the Overlord
have been limited only by the resistance of his subjects; those
* This essay was originally presented by Northcutt Ely as an address to the International Bar Association's Seminar on World Energy Laws, May 6, 1975, in Stavangar,
Norway.
** B.A., Stanford University; J.D., Stanford University; Member, District of Columbia Bar.
*** B.S. in Petroleum Engineering, St.anfordUniversity; J.D., University of Virginia;
Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. G . AGRICOLA,
DE RE METALLICA
(H. Hoover & L. Hoover transls. 1912).
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of the State limited by the landlord; those of the landlord by the
Sovereign or by the State; while the miner, ever in a minority
in influence as well as i n numbers, has been buffeted from pillar
to post, his only protection being the fact that all other parties
depend upon his exertion and skill.*

The miner's position vis-a-vis the overlord, the state, and the
landlord has changed very little since the Hoovers wrote the
above-quoted passage.

In order to understand the changing concepts of the world's
mineral development laws, it is useful to review the antecedents
of those laws. We do not know when man first learned the use of
metals, but we know that mining dates back at least to the Neolithic age. Durant writes:
[I]n the ruins of a neolithic mine a t Brandon, England, eight
worn picks of deerhorn were found, on whose dusty surfaces were
the finger-prints of the workmen who had laid down those tools
ten thousand years ago. In Belgium the skeleton of such a New
Stone Age miner, who had been crushed by falling rock, was
discovered with his deerhorn pick still clasped in his hands;
across a hundred centuries we feel him as one of us, and share
in weak imagination his terror and agony. Through how many
bitter millenniums men have been tearing out of the bowels of
the earth the mineral bases of ci~ilization!~

Very little is known of mining in the ancient civilizations
which predated Greece. We know, however, that in ancient Egypt
mines were the property of the pharoah, and mining was a government monopoly. The Egyptians operated mines in Arabia and
Nubia, and worked these mines with slave labor. It is also known
that oil pitch was mined in ancient Babylonia and that silver was
minted into coins in Assyria. But it is not until the Greek civilization that we have any record of mining laws. A mining industry
flourished in ancient Greece from 700 B.C. to 200 B.C. Mineral
ownership was governed by the "regalian system," that is, minerals were considered to be the property of the state, regardless of
rights, however, were
.~
who owned the overlying ~ u r f a c e Mining
2. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
3. W. DURANT,
1 THESTORY
OF CIVILIZATION:
OURORIENTAL
HERITAGE
100 (1954).
4. A distinction is often made between ownership of minerals by the state and control
of exploration and production by the state. Where this distinction is made, the former is
referred to as the "dominal system;" the latter, the "regalian system."
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granted to private individuals. The area of the mining right was
defined by vertical boundaries, and the term of the right was from
3 to 10 years, depending on whether the mine had been worked
previously. The miner was required to meet certain work obligations and to pay the state a royalty of one twenty-fourth of the
net profits from his operation; the surface owner received nothing.
The Greeks had an elaborate (for the times) mining administration. A director of mines considered applications from individuals
seeking mining rights and determined where such individuals
might prospeQ for ore. Matters such as location with reference to
the direction and extent of veins and the proper distance between
different claims in the same area were governed by regulations.
In early Roman law, a fundamentally different form of mineral ownership prevailed. Ownership of the surface carried with
it the ownership of any minerals beneath the surface. This theory
of mineral ownership is generally known as the "accession system." This term is derived from the concept of minerals "acceding" to the surface owner upon discovery. Notwithstanding the
fact that the accession system existed under early Roman law, the
legacy of the Roman Empire for mining systems in the modern
world was not the accession system, but rather the regalian system. This resulted from the fact that the great majority of mines
and known mineral deposits outside of Italy were acquired by
conquest, and hence became the property of the Republic, and
later the Empire. Due to this extensive state ownership of mines,
the underlying theory that the state holds primary control over
all mineral resources became accepted. Many of the Roman Empire's state-owned mines were worked by private individuals and
companies operating under licenses granted by the state. Other
mines were worked directly by state enterprises. As in Greece,
there was a formal administrative system to handle mining matters. Mining districts were established and placed under the authority of an official called the Procurator Metallorum, who was
responsible for the granting of mining rights within his district.
The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century
A.D. occasioned the breakdown of central government in Western
Europe with an accompanying breakdown of European mining
law systems. During the Middle Ages, Europe was governed by
hundreds of feudal lords who generally claimed ownership of the
minerals within their respective areas of authority. Warfare
among these feudal lords was common, and was often caused by
disputes over mines. Because of this deterioration in mining law
and administration, mining as an industry was generally neglected during the Middle Ages.

12

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

By the 12th century, however, mining "communities" had
developed in Germany; by the 13th century, in England. The
customs that evolved in the mining communities of these two
nations would play an important part in the mining law of the
United States and, ultimately, in the laws of numerous other
modern nations.
The customs of the German mining communities, confirmed
in the communities' charters, gave rise to the concept of "free
mining," under which a miner was "free" to enter the land of
another to prospect for or exploit mineral resources. The system
of mineral ownership was regalian, and the miner could acquire
a lease from the overlord to develop an ore body by compliance
with certain rules. These rules provided several incentives for
discovery. First, the discoverer was given a right to work the ore
body which was superior to the rights of anyone else. Second, the
discoverer was granted a larger area within which to exercise his
mining rights than were other minem5 In return for the right to
mine, the miner paid a tribute or royalty to the Crown and, if he
was operating upon private lands, he paid an additional tribute
to the landlord. He was also obligated to work diligently and
continuously; failure to do so could result in the forfeiture of his
mining right.
Another important development in mining law originating in
these early German mining communities is the "apex" concept
of title. Under the apex concept, the miner is permitted an "extralateral right" to pursue a vein in its downward dip, regardless
of the surface boundaries. This concept flows logically from the
idea that the surface and mineral estates are two quite different
things.
Customary rules of mining law also developed in certain English mining communities. In England, the general rule, under the
common law, was that minerals were the property of the surface
owner, except for gold, silver, and minerals beneath navigable
waters (including the seas), all of which belonged to the Crown.
In certain parts of England, however, such as Cornwall, Derbyshire, Devon, and the Forest of Dean, ownership of all minerals
was considered to vest in the Crown, subject to long-established
customs which created certain rights in the miner. As to the
origin of these customs, Lindley writes:
5. A discoverer was awarded a "head meer," which measured approximately 294 feet
along the length of the vein by 42 feet. Other miners were granted a "regular meer," which
measured 84 feet by 42 feet.

CHANGING CONCEPTS
These customs undoubtedly had their origin during the
Roman occupation; but they were recognized and established by
acts of parliament upon the theory that they existed by virtue
of some antecedent grant or concession made by the crown."

These mining communities developed unique rules of mining law.
For example, in Cornwall, tin miners were given a free right of
entry. A "free tinner" could establish his "bound" by marking an
area (usually about an acre) a t the four corners with stones or
pieces of turf. This bound was then announced in the stannary
courts;' if no objection was heard, the court issued a writ of possession. The miner was then entitled to search for and extract ore
within the area of his bound, subject to certain regulations. He
was required to maintain continuous operations, to renew his
bound annually, and to pay a royalty called a "dish" or "toll7' to
the owner of the surface. Tin bounds could be sold or demised,
and were liable for the payment of debts. Similar customary rules
developed in Devon (tin), in Derbyshire (lead), where the apex
concept was recognized, and in the Forest of Dean (coal and iron).
Until the end of the 18th century, the civil law of Spain was
similar to that of common law England. It was stated by Gamboa
as follows:
By the civil law, all veins and mineral deposits of gold or
silver ore, or of precious stones, belonged, if in public ground to
the sovereign, and were part of his patrimony; but if in private
property, they belonged to the owner of the land, subject to the
condition, that if worked by the owner, he was bound to render
a tenth part of the produce to the prince as a right attaching to
his crown; and if worked by any other person, by consent of the
owner, the former was liable to the payment of two-tenths, one
to the prince and one to the owner.
Subsequently, it became an established custom in most
kingdoms, and was declared by the particular laws and statutes
of each, that all veins of the precious metals, and the produce
of such veins, should vest in the crown, and be held to be a part
of the patrimony of the king or sovereign p r i n ~ e . ~

Then, on May 23, 1783, King Charles 111of Spain issued a royal
ordinance that declared all mines to be the property of the Crown,
T c . LINDLEY, 1 A TREATISE
ON THE AMERICAN
LAW RELATING
TO MINES AND MINERAL
LANDS9 (3d ed. 1914).
7. The mining communities were chartered as corporations called "stannaries" and

granted legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The courts of the communities were
known as "stannary courts."
8. F. GAMBOA, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWSOF MINING15 (1830).
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without regard to the type of mineral or the location thereof. This
ordinance brought nearly all of the Spanish colonies in America
under the regalian system.
Under this later Spanish system, a subject of the Crown
a mine upon the property of any individual,
could "deno~nce"~
provided that adequate compensation was paid to the surface
owner. A grant by the Crown vested in the grantee the right to
possession and occupation, with a further right to dispose of the
grant on the same two conditions as those under which it had
been received: (1)payment to the Crown of a royalty of one-fifth
of the minerals produced, and (2) compliance with relevant regulations prescribed by ordinance. Failure to comply with these
regulations resulted in forfeiture of the property, after which it
became subject to denouncement. Further, the Spanish system
protected the surface owner from potential damage to his property to the extent that he was entitled to compensation for its use.
Also, judicial proceedings were provided to resolve conflicting
claims as to priority of discovery or registration.
In France, a somewhat different theory of mineral ownership
developed. Prior to the French Revolution, the accession system
prevailed. During the Revolution, however, the landowners were
forced to renounce their rights to minerals beneath their lands to
the state, and the law of July 28, 1791 reserved to the state the
right to regulate mineral exploration and production. This right
was reaffirmed in the mining law of 1810 and incorporated in the
Napoleonic Code. Under the French system, ownership of the
mineral deposit does not vest in the surface owner; rather, the
deposit is res nullius until discovered and reduced to effective
possession. The state retains the absolute right to determine who
shall develop the mineral deposit. A vestige of the landowner's
former right to subsurface minerals remains in the form of a right
to a royalty.

Much of the world's mineral wealth has been developed by
American companies operating in foreign countries under agreements with the host governments. Most of these agreements reflect some aspect of U.S. mining or petroleum legislation, because
the terms were bargained for by American companies accustomed
to operating under that legislation. Therefore, before considering
9. A "denouncement" is a type of tenure similar to the American mining claim.
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the various forms these agreements may take, let us first look
briefly a t mining and petroleum legislation in the United States.
Systems of mineral ownership in the United States are rather
complicated and not a t all uniform. As a general rule, the mineral
estate is part of the surface estate and passes with it, unless and
until severed. Title to minerals may be held by the federal government, a state government, or an individual, initially as a consequence of ownership of the surface.
When the Thirteen Original Colonies achieved independence
from England in 1776, they individually took title to large tracts
of public land, some within their established boundaries but most
of it far to the west. The colonies ceded to the federal government
upon the signing of the Articles of Confederation all lands
claimed by them west of their established borders. These lands
were the beginning of what came to be known as the public domain. The Ordinance of 1785,1° the first land legislation adopted
by the Continental Congress, provided for the fee simple sale of
lands within the public domain. Following the enactment of the
Federal Constitution in 1789, Congress reaffirmed in a 1796 act
the principle that public domain could be transferred in fee simple." This act made no provision for the reservation of mineral
rights to the federal government, and Congress made no change
in this policy until the Pre-emption Act in 1841.12Between 1796
and 1841, vast areas of land were added to the public domain as
a consequence of territorial acquisitions by the United States,
namely, the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the Treaty with
Spain of 1819. During this period, the policy of the United States
was to sell public land to individuals for revenue, and numerous
sales were made without reservation of minerals to the federal
government.
Reservation of minerals to the federal government commenced with the Pre-emption Act of 1841, which provided that
"no lands on which are situated any known salines or mines shall
be liable to entry under and by virtue of the provisions of this
act."13 It is important to note that the reservation provided for in
the Pre-emption Act was not simply a reservation of minerals or
mines, but rather a reservation of lands on which mines or miner10. 28 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS
375 (1785).
11. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 0 0 1-12, 1 Stat. 464 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
12. Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, 00 1-17, 5 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
13. Id. 0 10.
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als exist. Thus, Congress rejected the separation of the mineral
estate from the surface estate that characterized European systems of mineral development.14 Although the severance of the
mineral estate from the surface estate was common on nonfederal
lands, Congress refused to recognize the severance of the two
estates until 1916, when it passed the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act.15
Subsequent to the Pre-emption Act of 1841, more land was
added to the public domain by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
with Mexico in 1848, the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico in 1853,
the Northwest Compromise with Britain of 1846 and 1872, and
the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. Congress granted
large portions of this public domain to states and to railroads as
a bonus for construction of their lines. Lands known to contain
minerals at the date of the grant were excluded and remained
under federal ownership, but if minerals were subsequently discovered, the grantee was recognized as holding title to both the
surface and the minerals.
Notwithstanding the reservation of mineral lands to the federal government in 1841, Congress failed to pass any general legislation for the development of the reserved minerals until 1866.
Consequently, when gold was discovered on federal lands in California in 1848, there was no positive law to regulate the thousands
of miners who flocked to the Sacramento Valley. These miners
occupied federal land technically as trespassers but with federal
acquiescence. The miners themselves soon recognized the need
for some form of regulation. Mining districts were organized and
local rules were adopted. These rules reflected customs reminiscent of those developed centuries earlier in the mining communities of England and Germany, but efforts to trace a direct line of
descent have not been altogether successful. The right of property
in mines was made dependent upon discovery and development;
discovery was the source of the right, but its continuance was
conditioned upon working and developing the mine. The rules
adopted b y the California miners also recognized the apex principle, that is, the right to work a vein down the dip to an indefinite
depth without regard to lateral surface boundaries.
In 1866, Congress enacted the first general mining legislation
14. The Continental Congress, however, recognized the mineral estate and surface
OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS
375, 378 (1785).
estate as separate estates. 28 JOURNALS
15. 43 U.S.C. $8 291-301 (1970) (originally enacted as Enlarged Homestead Act of
1916, ch. 9, $0 1-11, 39 Stat.. 862).
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in the United States? This act announced three important
principles: (1) all mineral lands in the public domain should be
free and open to exploration and occupation; (2) rights to mineral
deposits in the public domain acquired under local rules, where
there was apparent acquiescence by the government, should be
recognized and confirmed; and (3) title to these mineral deposits
might ultimately be obtained upon compliance with certain statutory procedures. In 1872, Congress passed additional mining
legislation dealing with the patenting of lode and placer mining
claims. l7
The Acts of 1866 and 1872 are still in effect. These, together
with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,ls which governs the acquisition of rights to nonmetallic minerals on the public domain, still
form the basic federal mineral legislation in the United States.
Under the 1866 and 1872 Acts, any person may enter upon public
land to explore for minerals. Upon discovery (valid discovery is
the basis of mineral rights), the miner is required to "locate" his
discovery by marking the location on the ground so that its
boundaries can be easily traced. The precise manner of location
is prescribed by statute and differs for lodes and placers. The
number of mining claims that may be located by an individual,
corporation, or association is unlimited, provided each location
contains a discovery. Once a valid discovery and location have
been made, the miner has acquired a vested interest in the mining claim and may extract minerals therefrom. If he wishes to
obtain title to the lands covered by his location, the miner must
seek a patent from the United States. Patent applications are
processed by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department
of the Interior. A payment is required to secure the patent, but it
is not related to the mineral value of the lands. There is no royalty
payment requirement. In the event of an adverse claim of right
by another party, the respective rights of the claimants may be
determined in any federal or state court having competent jurisdiction. As a general rule, priority of discovery governs as between
claimants. After the miner has complied with the procedural requirements and has paid the purchase price for his claim, he
receives a certificate which has the effect of vesting equitable title
16. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262,
1-11, 14 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections
of 30 U.S.C.).
17. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 4 4 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections
of 30 U.S.C.).
18. Act of Feb. 5, 1920, ch. 85, 9 § 1-38, 41 Stat. 437 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
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to the property in him. Subsequent issuance of the patent vests
complete title, legal and equitable, in the miner and relates back
to the inception of the right, that is, to the date of discovery and
location. The patent conveys title not only to the mineral estate
but to the surface estate as well.
The location system provides the individual miner with an
incentive to undertake exploration activities. This system was
largely responsible for the development of the vast mineral wealth
of the Western United States, and it remains the basis of American mining law relating to hard minerals. Outside of the United
States, however, the location system is seldom encountered
today.
Oil, gas, and other nonmetallic minerals located on federal
lands are regulated by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. On the
public domain, such minerals are not subject to location and
patent and may be developed only under a lease. If land lies
within the known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field,
a lease may be awarded only by competitive bidding. Otherwise,
no competitive bidding is required, and the lease will be issued
to the first applicant. Competitive leases may be issued for areas
not exceeding 640 acres and for a primary term of 5 years and so
long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities.
The primary term will not be extended unless at the time of its
expiration actual drilling operations are being conducted, in
which case the term may be extended for 2 years and as long
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. Royalties payable to the United States under competitive leases may
not be less than one-eighth of the amount or value of production,
and may be higher if specified in the notice of sale and the lease.
The annual rental is $2 per acre prior to discovery, unless a different rate is specified in the lease. Special royalty and rental provisions apply to leases in Alaska. Bids are on a cash bonus basis,
and leases are awarded to the highest qualified bidder.
Noncompetitive leases, which are issued for lands that do not
lie within the known geologic structure of a producing field, may
be acquired by filing an application with the Bureau of Land
Management. A noncompetitive lease grants an exclusive right to
conduct operations in an area not exceeding 2,560 acres for a
primary term of 10 years and as long thereafter as oil and gas is
produced in paying quantities. Absent discovery in commercial
quantities, the primary term will not be extended unless actual
drilling is taking place a t the time of expiration, in which case an
extension may be allowed for 2 years and as long thereafter as oil
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and gas is produced in paying quantities. The federal government
receives a one-eighth royalty on a noncompetitive lease, payable
on any oil or gas production under the lease. Annual rentals for
noncompetitive leases are $0.50 per acre. Special provisions apply
to noncompetitive leases issued prior to September 2, 1960.
Under both competitive and noncompetitive leases, the lessee acquires ownership of the mineral production of the lease. The
lessee's rights to the surface area are limited, however, to the use
of the area necessary to his mineral operations, and the United
States reserves the right to dispose of the remaining surface area
by sale, lease, or other manner. The Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to provide in the lease for due diligence and the prevention of waste.
The Mineral Leasing Act does not apply to federal lands
acquired after February 25, 1920. In 1947, however, Congress enacted the Acquired Lands Act,l%hich authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to lease "acquired lands," that is, lands acquired
by the United States not subject to the Mineral Leasing Act,
under the same terms and conditions as provided for in the Mineral Leasing Act. The Acquired Lands Act applies only to those
minerals covered by the Mineral Leasing Act, that is, nonmetallic
minerals. Nevertheless, leases of mining rights for hard minerals
on acquired lands may be obtained if provided for in either the
statute under which the particular lands were acquired or the
statutes applicable to the federal agency having jurisdiction over
the particular lands. The location laws do not apply to acquired
lands.
With respect to offshore mineral development, the Submerged Lands Act of 195320vests mineral jurisdiction in seabed
areas beneath the territorial waters of the United States in the
adjacent individual state. Beyond these territorial waters, the
jurisdiction is federalz1and mineral development is regulated by
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.2zUnder that Act,
leases in offshore areas beyond United States territorial waters
are awarded by competitive bidding. The Secretary has authority
to either (1) fix the royalty a t not less than 12.5 percent and
19. 30 U.S.C. § § 351 & note, 352-59 (1970) (originally enacted in 1947 as Mineral
Leasing Act for Acquired Lands ch. 513, § § 1-10, 61 Stat. 913).
20. 43 U.S.C. $ § 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1970) (originally enacted in 1953 as Submerged Lands Act ch. 65, §§ 1-11, 67 Stat. 29).
21. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
22. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970) (originally enacted in 1953 as Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act ch. 345, §§ 1-17, 67 Stat. 462).
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accept bids on the cash bonus, or (2) fix the cash bonus and
accept bids on the royalty. Leases are awarded to the highest
qualified bidder. Leases may be awarded for an area not exceeding 5,760 acres and for a term not exceeding 5 years and as long
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities, or for
as long thereafter as drilling or other operations approved by the
Secretary are conducted.
With respect to seabed areas that are beyond the jurisdiction
of the United States and other nations, there is presently pending
in both houses of Congress legislation that would permit and
regulate mining operations by United States companies.23The
jurisdictional bases of this legislation are the freedom of the seas
doctrine and the universally recognized principle that a sovereign
state may regulate the activities of its nationals on the high seas.
Under the Multiple Use Acts of 195424and 1955,25the development of mineral resources on public lands may go forward on
the same tract of land under both the mining laws of the United
States and the Mineral Leasing Act. Thus, the Acts opened up
some 60 million acres of public lands previously under oil and gas
leases to location for hard minerals. At the same time, the Acts
authorized operations for leasable minerals on lands which previously had been opened to location under the mining laws.
Although most federally owned land is subject to mineral
entry and development under the various laws described above,
certain types of federal land are not. For example, Indian reservations may not be entered under the general mining and leasing
laws; minerals on Indian lands must be developed under a special
system of federal laws relating to such lands. Other types of federal land subject to restrictions or special provisions relating to
mineral development include military reservations, national
parks, national forests, reclamation withdrawals, and reservations made under the Federal Power Act.
The methods of acquiring mineral interests in state lands are
prescribed by the respective state legislature^.^^ In most cases,
23. S. 713,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (reported by the Oceanography Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on March 16, 1976); H.R. 11,879,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (reported by the full Senate Interior Comm. on March 18,1976.
24. 30 U.S.C. 9 9 521 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Multiple Use Law of 1954,
ch. 730, $9 1-13, 68 Stat. 708).
25. 30 U.S.C. § § 611 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted a s Act of July 23, 1955, ch.
375, 9 9 1-7, 69 Stat. 367).
26. It should be noted that none of the federal mining legislation in the United States
applies to areas within Texas. Unlike other territorial acquisitions of the United States,
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state lands have been disposed of without any reservation of minerals. In some instances, however, states have granted leases for
lands believed to contain valuable minerals.
On privately owned lands, ownership of the mineral estate
vests in the owner of the surface estate, unless and until severed.
Thus, a prospective mineral developer on privately owned land
must negotiate with the private owner for any rights he wishes to
obtain. Transfer of mineral rights and titles among private owners is accomplished within the legal framework of each state relating to property titles, sales and conveyances, leases, licenses, and
contracts.
Most of the onshore oil and gas in the United States has been
discovered on private lands and, hence, is not subject to the federal Mineral Leasing Act. Oil and gas operations on nonfederal
private lands are, however, regulated by state laws. Authority to
regulate such operations is derived from the states' police power.
State regulation is usually based on the concept of "prorationing," under which an administrative determination is made concerning the quantity that a field may produce per day. That
quantity is then apportioned among the wells in the particular
field.27 States, as an exercise of their police powers, may also
regulate the spacing and drilling of wells. The purpose of such
state legislation is to prevent waste and protect the correlative
rights of the common owners of an oil and gas pool.

Most of the world's proved petroleum reserves have been
discovered by companies operating under some form of petroleum
concession. A concession is essentially a contractual agreement
between a company and a government that confers certain rights
and corresponding obligations upon both parties. A concession is
also a document of title against which money can be borrowed.
But most of the concessions in force today bear little resemblance
to those which opened up the vast oil fields of the Middle East,
North Africa, and Latin America during the first half of this
century. And, as we shall see, the present trend is toward quite
the acquisition of the Republic of Texas produced no federal public domain. When Texas
entered the Union, it retained title to all the public land within its boundaries. Consequently, the vast mineral resources of that state-including the oil and gas resourceshave been developed entirely under state law.
27. Of the major oil-producing states in the United States, only California has no
prorationing system.
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different relationships between host country and foreign investor.
The first successful petroleum concession in the Middle East
was the famous D'Arcy Concession, which was granted by Persia
to William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman, in 1901. Under the
terms of this concession, D'Arcy was given the exclusive right to
explore for and exploit the petroleum resources of Persia, except
for five northern provinces, for a period of 60 years. D'Arcy was
also granted the exclusive right to lay pipelines in the concession
area, and was given exemption from all Persian taxes. In return,
D'Arcy agreed to form an exploitation company within 2 years,
and to pay the Persian government a royalty of 16 percent of the
company's profits. D'Arcy also paid a cash bonus of £20,000, and
agreed to give the government a £20,000 interest in the exploitation company. The parties further agreed that, upon expiration
of the concession, title to all of the company's immovable property would pass to the government without charge.
Although these terms are modest by present-day standards,
they must be judged in the context of the investment climate that
prevailed in Persia in 1901. It was not known at that time whether
marketable quantities of oil even existed in Persia. The Persian
government was weak, corrupt, and heavily in debt. Large parts
of the country were controlled by local tribal chiefs who did not
recognize the government's authority. In nearby Mesopotamia,
concessions owned by Germany's Deutsche Bank had recently
been nationalized by the Turkish government without compensation. Consequently, Western financiers were not interested in
risking capital in Persian oil ventures. It is doubtful that concession terms significantly more favorable to the government would
have induced anyone to attempt to develop Persia's petroleum
resources. Indeed, even under the terms of the 1901 concession,
D'Arcy's operations were plagued by financial crisis on more than
one occasion. D'Arcy spent over £200,000 of his own money on
exploration efforts without success. When he was unable to raise
additional capital, he formed a joint venture with Burmah Oil
Company, which agreed to provide the capital required to continue operations under the concession agreement. Oil was finally
discovered in 1908, and a new exploitation company called AngloPersian was formed to develop and produce the discovery. Even
the capital resources of Anglo-Persian proved insufficient to exploit Persia's oil, however. It was not until the British government
agreed to provide £ 2,000,000 in return for a majority interest in
Anglo-Persian that the company was able to raise the capital
necessary to develop the Persian resources.
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In the meantime, a revolution had occurred in Turkey and
several companies had begun to negotiate concession rights with
the new government. These negotiations were terminated by
World War I, which resulted in the dissolution of the Turkish
Empire. Following the war, the companies began negotiating with
the newly formed government of Iraq, which now had jurisdiction
over the area of interest. In 1925, Iraq entered into a concession
agreement with a consortium called the Turkish Petroleum Company (later, the Iraq Petroleum Company), owned by an American group, Anglo-Persian, Shell, CFP (French), and the Gulbenkian interest. This concession agreement is of particular importance because it served as a model for other concession agreements in the Middle East and elsewhere. As amended in 1931, the
concession granted the company the exclusive right to explcre for
and exploit petroleum resources in a n area of approximately
35,000 square miles for a period of 75 years. In addition, the
company was exempted from all Iraqi taxes. The company agreed
to pay a royalty of 4 shillings gold on each ton (approximately 7
American barrels) of oil produced, with a minimum annual
royalty of f400,000 gold. (After 1932, payments were made in
sterling, based on the prevailing price of gold in the London market.) The company also agreed to make tax commutation payments of f9,000 gold per annum until exports began, and thereafter payments of ;E60,000 gold for the first 4 million tons of export, and f 20,000 gold for each additional million tons of export.
The company agreed to commence exploration within 8 months
and to build a pipeline system with a capacity of not less than 3
million tons per year. The company further agreed that the pipeline and all other immovable property would be surrendered without charge to the government upon termination of the concession.
Subsequent to the 1925 agreement between Iraq and the
Turkish Petroleum group, there was a proliferation of concession
agreements in the Middle East and north Africa. These concessions were generally quite simple and were characterized by the
following terms:
(1) The rights granted were exclusive, and usually included
the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport, refine, sell,
and export petroleum and natural gas.
(2) The principal form of compensation to the host government was a royalty, which was usually fixed a t 4 shillings gold or
3 rupees per ton of crude produced and saved. Some of the concessions also provided for rents, bonuses, and tax commutation
payments. The company was usually exempt from all taxes.
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(3) The concession area was generally quite large, sometimes covering the entire country.
(4) The duration of the concession was typically from 60 to
75 years.
(5) The company was allowed to import into the host country all machinery, materials, and other property necessary to its
petroleum operations free of import duties and restrictions.
(6) Failure to meet contract obligations resulting from the
occurrence of force majeure was not considered a breach of contract.
(7) Disputes were settled by arbitration. One arbitrator was
appointed by the government and one by the company. The two
appointed arbitrators would attempt to agree on a third. Failing
agreement, the third arbitrator was selected by a designated individual, typically a judge on the World Court. Arbitral decisions
were by majority vote.
These conclusions did not make provision for production levels or prices of crude oil. By implication, the rights to control
production and prices vested -in the companies. This situation
-company control of production and prices-would, in the
years to come, cause such discontent among oil-producing nations as to ultimately bring about an end to the concession system.

VENTURE
AND PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENTS:
THEDEMISE
IV. JOINT
OF THE CONCESSION
SYSTEM
Almost from the start, the governments of the oil-producing
countries sought to improve upon the terms in their concession
agreements. Persia, for example, became disenchanted with the
royalty provision in its agreement with Anglo-Persian since the
royalty, although a generous (for the times) 16 percent, was tied
to the company's profits. If the company was unable to make a
profit on its Persian operations, the government received no royalty income. In Iraq, the government attempted to insert a 20
percent participation provision in its concession agreement with
the Turkish Petroleum Company. The host governments, however, lacked the bargaining power necessary to impose more favorable terms on the companies. During the 1930's, there was a
surplus of oil on the world market, so a threat to curtail production lacked much of the force it would have today. Furthermore,
there were relatively few companies holding oil concessions in the
1930's, and competition between those companies for concessions
was minimal. Consequently, the governments were unable to ob-
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tain better terms by playing the companies off against one another. Also, these companies controlled downstream operations,
and a government that nationalized its concessions ran the risk
that it would be unable to market its oil.
The first successful government demand for greater revenues
from an existing concession came not in the Middle East but in
Venezuela. Company-government relations in that country began
to deteriorate in 1936 following the death of General Juan Vincente Gomez, who had originally granted the concessions to the
companies. During World War 11, the government's bargaining
position improved as the allies became increasingly dependent on
Venezuelan oil, and in 1943, Venezuela began imposing taxes in
addition to royalties on the companies. In 1948, a new income tax
law was passed which taxed the companies' profits a t the rate of
50 percent.
The other oil-exporting nations quickly followed Venezuela's
example. In 1950, Saudi Arabia became the first Middle Eastern
government to implement a 50-50 scheme. Within two years, the
50-50 profit-sharing principle had been grafted onto almost all of
the world's oil concession agreements.
The 50-50 profit-sharing scheme was implemented in various
ways, but the result was essentially the same in each concession
arrangement. Gross income was generally computed on "posted
prices," that is, prices published by the companies for f.0.b. sales
in single-cargo lots. In a few countries such as Libya and Algeria,
however, gross income was based on realized prices. The company's profit was determined by subtracting production costs
from gross income. Fifty percent of the profit was then paid to the
government. Any royalties, rents, or other exactions were credited
against the 50 percent payment, except in Venezuela, where royalties were treated as an expense rather than a credit against
taxes. In some states, such as Saudi Arabia, the companies were
allowed to deduct taxes paid to other governments for purposes
of calculating their taxable profits.
During the 1950's, a number of nations enacted comprehensive petroleum legislation. This legislation prescribed the terms
upon which various rights relating to hydrocarbon resources
would be granted. Many of these petroleum codes provided for
concession agreements-sometimes called an "exploitation license" or a "leasew-only in the production stage of operations,
and limited their duration to 30 or 40 years. In such cases, separate rights were defined and required for surface reconnaissance
("reconnaissance permits") and for exploration ("exploration licenses").
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A new method of royalty payment that allowed the government to take its royalty in "cash or kind" was introduced in the
Middle East in 1952. In February of that year, Iraq and the Iraq
Petroleum Company renegotiated their concession agreement to
reflect the 50-50 profit-sharing principle. The new agreement also
gave the government the option of taking either 12.5 percent of
the net oil production, or its cash equivalent based on posted
prices. This form of royalty soon became standard throughout
most of the world.
Several other provisions became commonplace in petroleum
concession agreements during the 1950's. These included relinquishment provisions, whereby the company agreed to give up
unexploited parts of the concession area after a stated period of
time, and provisions requiring that the company make minimum
expenditures on operations. Also, bonus provisions became more
substantial and more sophisticated during this period. Typically,
the newer provisions provided that bonuses be paid (1) a t the
time the concession agreement was signed, (2) when commercial
discovery of oil occurred, and (3) when the company reached
prescribed levels of production.
The first break from the 50-50 profit-sharing principle occurred in 1957, when ENI, the Italian state oil company, formed
a joint company with Iran's NIOC and agreed to pay a 50 percent
tax on ENI's one-half share of the profits. This arrangement resulted in an effective 75-25 profit-sharing, with Iran taking the
larger share. In return, the government agreed to reimburse onehalf of the exploration and development costs in the event that
exploration was successful, and to forego the traditional cash
bonus on the signing of the concession. Shortly thereafter, a Japanese organization operating as the Arabian Oil Company signed
a joint venture agreement with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In
1958, Standard of Indiana signed a joint venture agreement with
Iran, and in 1961, Shell entered into a joint venture agreement
with Kuwait. A 1965 agreement between Saudi Arabia and a
subsidiary of ERAP, a French state-owned concern, introduced
government participation in intergrated operations, including
refining, transportation, and marketing.
The 50-50 profit-sharing principle was further eroded when
the world market prices for refined petroleum products plummeted in 1957, and the oil-exporting nations opposed a corresponding adjustment in posted prices. At first, the companies agreed
to keep posted prices at existing levels, and sales to distributors
were made a t artificially high prices, but in 1960, the companies
lowered posted prices to reflect world market conditions. As a

91

CHANGING CONCEPTS

27

result of this action, a meeting of oil-exporting nations convened
in Baghdad on September 5, 1960. This meeting gave birth to
OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Article 2(A) of the Organization's statute sets forth the reason for
creating OPEC:
The principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination
and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries
and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their
interests, individually and collectively.

.

Within 15 years, relentless pursuit of this objective by OPEC's
members would totally and unilaterally refashion the legal relationships between oil companies and governments of producing
nations.
In 1964, OPEC succeeded in its efforts to have royalties
treated for tax purposes as an expense rather than a credit. As a
result, the effective profit-sharing ratio increased from 50-50 to
58-42 in the governments' favor. Nevertheless, the producing governments still recognized in principle 50-50 profit-sharing. Then,
in 1970, Libya unequivocally abandoned the 50-50 concept by
declaring a 55 percent tax and threatening to nationalize any
company that did not cooperate. At the same time, Libya demanded that the companies increase their posted prices. When
the companies attempted to negotiate these demands, the government imposed production cutbacks and ordered them to increase exploration activity or surrender unexplored parts of their
concessions. In September of 1970, the companies capitulated to
the government's demands and, in December of 1970, representatives of the OPEC nations convened in Caracas to formulate new
policies based on the Libyan experience. In the same month,
legislation was introduced in Venezuela to increase the tax rate
to 60 percent and give the government authority to set tax reference prices unilaterally. The Caracas conference was followed by
the Teheran and Tripoli agreements of 1971, whereby companies
operating in the Middle East and north Africa-threatened with
joint reprisals by OPEC members-agreed to a 55 percent tax
rate and substantially increased posted prices.
After effectively discarding the 50-50 principle, the oilproducing nations moved to achieve participation interests in
existing concession arrangements. At its September 1971 conference in Beirut, OPEC passed a resolution that called upon all
members to "take immediate steps towards the implementation
of effective participation in existing oil concessions." On January
1, 1973, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar signed agreements
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with their concessionaires whereby the governments acquired a 25
percent interest in the operations of the concessionaires, with
options to increase this interest to a maximum of 51 percent by
1982. By 1974, however, these three governments and others had
exacted a 60 percent interest from their concessionaires. Aramco
recently acceded to Saudi Arabia's demand for a 100 percent
takeover, and Venezuela is in the process of implementing the
complete nationalization of all foreign petroleum and mining investments. The list is constantly legnthening.

Concession agreements are being replaced by "work contracts" and "production-sharing contracts." Under both of these
new government-company relationships, the company, rather
than being a property owner, is simply a contractor providing the
capital and expertise necessary for exploration, development, and
production of the host country's oil reserves. Under the work contract, the company is granted the right to purchase a certain
percentage of the oil produced. Under production-sharing contracts the company receives a percentage of the oil produced,
rather than the right to buy such a percentage, as under the work
contract. Title passes to the company a t the point of export.

A.

Work Contracts

An example of the work contract is the agreement entered
into by ERAP and Iran's NIOC on December 12,1966. Under this
agreement, the company is given the exclusive right to act as
general contractor for NIOC in the areas specified, but title to all
petroleum produced vests in NIOC. The company supplies all
funds necessary to finance exploration operations and, if no commercial discovery results, bears the full costs of exploration. Further, the company undertakes minimum expenditure obligations,
which differ for onshore and offshore areas. If the company fails
to meet these obligations, NIOC may terminate the contract. In
addition, the company agrees to relinquish certain parts of the
original contract area during the exploration phase. The relinquishment provisions, like the minimum expenditure provisions,
differ for onshore and offshore areas.
In the event of commercial discovery, the company must
provide the funds necessary to develop the particular field and
must continue to meet exploration commitments in other parts
of the contract area. Once commercial production (as defined in
the agreement) is achieved, however, NIOC is obligated to reim-

%
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burse the company for costs incurred in exploration and development operations. Development costs are reimbursed with interest, but exploration costs are not. Reimbursements of both kinds
of costs are made over a period of years according to formulas
prescribed by the agreement.
Commercial production also obligates NIOC to pay for a percentage of the operating costs out of an operating fund established when commercial production is achieved. This fund is financed by contributions from NIOC and the company, each
party contributing amounts in proportion to the percentage of
production to which it is entitled.
Fifty percent of the recoverable reserves discovered by the
company are set aside as national reserves on a field-by-field
basis. These reserves are then excluded from further development
by the company under the terms of the agreement.
The principal benefit accruing to the company under its
agreement with NIOC is a guaranteed right to purchase for 25
years a certain percentage of the oil produced from fields other
than those set aside as national reserves. This percentage varies
from 35 percent to 45 percent depending on the distance between
the particular field and the export terminal. The price paid is the
sum of (1) the amortized per barrel cost of exploration, development, and production, (2) 2 percent of this amortized cost, and
(3) 50 percent of the difference between the cost per barrel and
the realized price per barrel based on current f.0.b. prices in the
Persian Gulf.
Under the terms of the agreement, the company does not pay
taxes, although the price increment amounting to 50 percent of
the difference between cost and selling price may be likened to a
tax, since it is paid to NIOC, a government agency. NIOC itself
is liable for taxation in accordance with the provisions of its statutes.
With respect to NIOC's share of the production, the company is obligated to sell certain amounts as specified in the contract. General management responsibility vests in the company,
but production levels are determined jointly by the company and
NIOC. The NIOC-ERAP work contract also contains standard
import, arbitration, and force majeure clauses similar to those
contained in most concession agreements.

B. Production-Sharing Contracts
An example of the production-sharing contract is the 1973
agreement between Indonesia's PERTAMINA and Mobile Petro-
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leum Indonesia, Inc. This 30-year contract covers an offshore area
in the Macassar Strait. Under this contract, as under the work
contract discussed above, the company is granted the exclusive
right to act as a general contractor for the state oil company
within the contract area. PERTAMINA holds title to oil in the
ground and at the well-head and is responsible for the management of operations undertaken pursuant to the agreement. The
company agrees to furnish all funds, equipment, and technical
expertise necessary to conduct exploration, development, and
production operations. In return, the company is entitled to receive a share of the oil produced and to recover all of its operating
costs-including exploration, -development, extraction, production, transportation, and marketing costs-out of a percentage of
the production which may not exceed 40 percent of the crude oil
won and saved. Of the production remaining after the reimbursement of operating costs, the company is entitled to take-not
purchase, as in the work contract-35 percent of the daily production where such production does not exceed 100,000 barrels per
day; 32.5 percent of daily production greater than 100,000barrels
per day but not more than 150,000 barrels per day; and 30 percent
of daily production in excess of 150,000 barrels per day. Title to
the company's share of the production passes at the point of
export. PERTAMINA's corresponding shares of production after
reimbursement of operating cost are 65 percent, 67.5 percent, and
70 percent. PERTAMINA is obligated to pay the company's Indonesian income tax out of PERTAMINA's share of the production.
The agreement limits the company in several other significant ways. For example, the company is obligated to sell to PERTAMINA part of its share of production for the domestic market
in Indonesia at a price of $0.20 per barrel. The amount of oil that
the company must sell to PERTAMINA is determined by a number of variables and may in some cases exceed 41 percent of the
company's share of production. Also, if the company's share of
production reaches 200,000 barrels per day, it is obligated to refine 10 percent of its production in Indonesia if requested to do
so by PERTAMINA. If there is no refining capacity for this purpose, the company must establish such refining capacity in Indonesia or, with PERTAMINA's permission, make an equivalent
investment in another project related to the petroleum or petrochemical industries. Further, a t any time within 3 months from
the date of the first discovery in the contract area, PERTAMINA
may demand that the company offer a 10 percent undivided in-
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terest in the rights and obligations accming under the contract
to an Indonesian entity, in return for which the company will
receive a specified compensation. Finally, the company agrees to
undertake certain minimum expenditures for exploration during
the first 10 years. The company also agrees to relinquish large
parts of the contract area during that same period. In the event
that commercial production is not achieved, the company must
bear the entire loss, as under the work contract.
VI. FUTUREARRANGEMENTS
To the extent that the oil-producing nations do not establish
their own oil-producing industries, they will remain dependent
upon foreign oil companies for the expertise and, in many instances, the capital required to develop their petroleum resources. In
order to attract this expertise and capital, the oil-producing nations will have to offer the companies some reasonable incentive.
The incentives and terms under which the companies will continue to operate are considerably different, however, from those
which prevailed during the first half of this century.
The trend has been away from the concession concept and
toward joint ventures, participation arrangements, or outright
government ownership with the company acting as a service contractor. Putting form aside for the moment, however, there is
little practical difference between the concession concept, the
joint venture, the participation arrangement, the work contract,
and the production-sharing contract. This is especially true when
the government has the power to unilaterally alter whatever arrangement is in force. In all five types of arrangements, the company contracts with the government to provide the capital and
expertise required to develop the host country's petroleum resources in return for a right to a share of the production. It is true
that concessions generally contained terms more favorable to the
companies than do the joint venture and participation arrangements, work contracts, and production-sharing contracts in force
today. This results, however, from the change that has occurred
in the relative bargaining positions of the companies and the
governments, not because the concession concept is inherently
any more favorable to the companies than the other kinds of
agreements.
It is also true that the concession vested in the company a
property right, and that this property right was diminished by the
advent of joint venture and participation arrangements, and entirely eliminated by the work contract and the production-
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sharing contract. As a practical matter, however, this property
right proved to be largely illusory, since it could be effectively
defeated by the host government by the enactment of increased
tax rates on the company's operations.
In the final analysis, what is important is how much oil the
company is allowed to take away from its operations and a t what
cost. Whether its right to this oil is characterized as a "contract
right" or a "property right" is less important than the amount of
profits that the right produces. These profits do not depend on
the nature or the type of agreement as much as they depend upon
the specific terms of the agreement; one company operating
under a work contract may have higher profits than another company operating under a concession.
Why, then, was there a shift away from the concession concept? The answer appears to be that oil-producing nations operating under the concession system desired to achieve de jure as
well as de facto control over their natural resources. Under the
concession system, the company was given control of the development of resources within the concession area; the company could
produce as much or as little oil as it wanted and had title to all
of the oil it produced. The property right that vested in the company under the concession concept implied the absence of a property right in the government and a corresponding absence of control. This apparent absence of control on the part of the government, however, proved to be just as illusory as the company's
property right, as illustrated by the unilateral tax increases and
production cutbacks in Libya in 1970.
Nevertheless, the ostensible relinquishment of control of natural resources had an adverse psychological effect on those governments operating under the concession system. The importance
to the oil-producing countries of retaining control over their natural resources is evidenced by the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, passed as a resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly in 1975.
Article 2 of this charter provides:
(1) Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all
its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.
(2) Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity
with its national objectives and priorities. No State

CHANGING CONCEPTS
shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to
foreign investment;
(b) To regulate and supervise t h e activities of
transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform
with its economic and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a
host State. Every State should, with full regard for its
sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in this subparagraph;
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought
on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.28

Taken literally, such policies would bring foreign investments to
a halt. The oil-exporting and mineral-exporting nations have expressed similar sentiments in numerous other forums. Obviously,
the notion of a property right vesting in a foreign oil company,
with corresponding rights of control, is not compatible with this
kind of sentiment. The elimination of the company's property
right-the theoretical cornerstone of the concession conceptwas a n effort by the oil-producing nations to reassert control
over their own natural resources.
If the transition from the concession concept to other forms
of government-company relationships was, in and of itself, one of
form rather than substance, what were the underlying substantive changes that accompanied this transition? As already indicated, the major change occasioned by this transition was a shift
in control of the development of the natural resources from the
companies to the governments. More specifically, it was a shift
from the companies to the governments of the power to (1)control
production, and (2) control prices. Under the concession system,
the governments for many years enjoyed neither of these powers.
28. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 50,U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974).
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But by the beginning of the present decade, the situation had
changed. Joint venture agreements had been in effect since 1957,
and work contracts and production-sharing contracts were implemented during the 1960's. The OPEC resolution calling for members to take immediate steps toward the implementation of effective participation in existing oil concessions was passed in September of 1971, and participation was implemented in early 1973.
Even prior to this time, certain of the OPEC nations had demonstrated their power to effectively control both prices and production. For example, in 1970, when Libya unilaterally increased its
tax rate to 55 percent and ordered the companies to increase their
posted prices, the government successfully imposed production
cutbacks in order to force the companies to comply. This exercise
of control over prices and production occurred under a concession
system in which the Libyan government had no participation
interest.
In light of the foregoing, several observations can be made
with respect to the probable form t h a t future governmentcompany relationships will take. First, it is clear that the concession system is being phased out. The property rights and control
of operations traditionally associated with that system are inherently a t odds with the nationalistic sentiment that characterizes
the developing nations. Future relationships will almost certainly
be in the form of joint ventures or participation agreements, with
the government holding the controlling interest, or service contracts. But, as already mentioned, the type of agreement is not
nearly as important as the specific terms, and these terms will be
a direct reflection of the respective bargaining powers of the companies and the governments. Where competition among foreign
oil companies for oil rights in a particular area is high, it can be
assumed that the terms offered by the host government will not
be as favorable to the company as where there is little or no
competition. Also, where the oil-producing nation has an established national oil industry and indigenous sources of capital, the
need for foreign assistance will be less, and the terms offered to
foreign companies will be correspondingly less favorable than
those offered by a country that does not have an established
national oil industry or the capital necessary to develop its resources.

VII. CONCLUSION
This essay has discussed changes. One unchanging reality
merits emphasis, however: until such time as the oil-producing
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nations of the world acquire the technology to develop their petroleum resources, they will remain dependent on foreign oil companies for that purpose. In the meantime, the Hoover's prophetic
words of 60 years ago describing the ebb and flow of the forces at
work between the state, the community (the consumer), the
landowner, and the miner remain true today-the miner is buffeted among them all and is saved only by the need of the other
three for his expertise.

